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<text> <title> Finding Peace through Democracy in Sahelian Africa </title> <article> <hdr> Current History, May 1992 Finding Peace through Democracy in Sahelian Africa </hdr> <body> By Richard L. Sklar--professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles, and Mark Strege--completing his master's degree in African studies at the University of California at Los Angeles. Africa today is tormented by the scourge of war. At the beginning of 1991, 15 African wars took their daily toll of casualties. (For a concise summary, see Raymond W. Copson, "Peace in Africa? The Influence of Regional and International Change," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington DC,: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 22-24.) These included civil wars in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa; clan and factional warfare in Somalia; an invasion of armed exiles into Rwanda; ethnic insurrections in northern Uganda; revolts by the Tuareg people in Mali and Niger; an insurrection against the non-Moorish, African minority in Mauritania; and the war in Western Sahara, where the Sahrawi are fighting for the region's independence from Morocco. All these conflicts were basically internal wars, yet their crossboundary ramifications embittered relations between neighboring states. In the somber view of Jacques Delors, president of the Commission of the European Community, Africa was on the verge of becoming "a zone of fundamental instability." (Quoted in Le Monde by Jacques de Barrin, "Africa--A Zone of Fundamental Instability?" Manchester Guardian Weekly, November 18, 1990, p. 16.) While recent current, and impending warfare in Africa underscored Delors's dire forecast, some conflicts on the continent have been resolved, and the manner in which they were concluded offers pathways to end ongoing disputes. No fewer than eight major military conflicts have ended since the Burkina Faso-Mali war of December 1985. They include the intermittent war between Chad and Libya, which appears to have ended in 1987; the western Zimbabwe insurrection, at its peak during the early 1980s and finally resolved through political negotiations in 1987; South Africa's attempts to destabilize Angola between 1975 and 1989; the Namibian war of independence from South Africa, concluded in 1989; the African National Congress's armed struggle against South Africa, which was suspended by the ANC in 1991 as part of a process designed to result in a non-racial democracy; a 30-yar civil war in Ethiopia, which concluded with the fall of Addis Ababa in 1991 and led to negotiations for the resolution of sundry disputes; a 16-year civil war in Angola, ended in 1991 as a result of negotiations sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as Portugal; the Liberian civil war of 1989-1991, which resulted in military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and subsequent, albeit as yet inconclusive, political negotiations. During 1991, several smoldering wars in the Sahelian region of West Africa appear to have been mitigated by conciliatory attitudes arising from a regional--and continental--movement for political democracy. In Mali and Niger, increased political freedom, representative national conferences, and transitional governments with democratic objectives have reduced the intensity of domestic conflicts. In Mauritania, political reforms, including multiparty elections in January 1992, may help reduce crossborder violence in the Senegal River Valley. However, in Chad, ethnic and factional violence continues to complicate a proclaimed transition to democracy. The simultaneous mitigation of these low-intensity conflicts provides an opportunity to assess comparatively the relationship between democratization and international conflict resolution in a single region. It has often been remarked that, in modern times, democracies have hardly ever waged wars against one another. Yet this obvious relationship between democracy and peace appears to have been discounted and largely overlooked by students of African international relations. A causal relationship between democracy and peace in Africa was nearly acknowledged in the report of a 1990 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, organized by the African Leadership Forum in collaboration with the secretariats of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. While the conferees specified the existence of a "link between development and democracy," they did not identify a similar link between democracy and peace. ("Report of a Brainstorming Meeting for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa," Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 17-18, 1990, pp. 7- 8.) The discussion that follows examines the presumptive relationship between democratization and the collective security of the states in Sahelian Africa. The Tuareg Insurrection in Mali and Niger The Tuareg, a Berber people who number between 1 million and 1.5 million, inhabit the northern regions of Mali and Niger. Their main urban settlement in Mali is in the city of Timbuktu, which was founded by Tuaregs in the twelfth century; in Niger their historical capital is Agadez. French colonial rule terminated an era of predation by the "blue men," so named for the Tuaregs' flowing indigo robes. By the time of Niger's and Mali's independence in 1960, the Tuareg were a relatively small minority of less than 10 percent in countries governed by those who had once been their victims. The sins of their forebears were visited on present-day Tuaregs in 1964, when a Tuareg rebellion was brutally subdued by the Malian armed forces. During the 1980s, periodic episodes of drought and famine led to an exodus of Tuaregs from Mali to Algeria, Libya, and other neighboring countries. Many of those who have since voluntarily returned or have been expelled as illegal immigrants live miserably in refugee camps in both Niger and Mali. Protests against alleged maltreatment in those camps set the stage for armed attacks against government installations in both countries during 1990. One group of Tuareg dissidents plotted to overthrow the one-party regime of General Moussa Traore; others have been secessionist. The counterinsurgency methods of the Malian army have been condemned for their brutality by Amnesty International and France's Socialist party. In turn, Traore's regime alleges that the rebels are Libyan proxies and that many of them belong to the Libyan Islamic Legion. To be sure, many able-bodied Sahelian emigres have soldiered for Libya, as they have for Iraq and the Afghan resistance. And the flames of Tuareg separatism are fanned by a belief that the French promised to create an independent Tuareg state in return for Tuareg participation in the French force fighting in colonial Indochina. In 1990, a United Nations Development Program report found that Niger and Mali were the two most deprived countries in the world. The report based this assessment on a new "human development index," which reflects "life expectancy, literacy, and command over the resources to enjoy a decent standard of living." Neither country has experienced effective economic management; at the same time, the two have faced recurrent drought and relentless ecological deterioration. (On Niger, see Robert B. Charlick, Niger: Personal Rule and Survival in the Sahel (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991). On Mali, see Joseph Roger de Benoist, Le Mali (Paris: Harmattan, 1989), and Pascal J. Imperato, Mali: A Search for Direction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).) In March 1991, after 23 years in power, the unpopular Traore regime was toppled by the Malian army. Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure, advised by representative civilians, began a political reform process designed to result in the establishment of a constitutional democracy. Although elections were to be held in January 1992 but then were postponed until April, partly because of unrest in the Tuareg regions, few observers doubt that a transition to civilian government will occur soon. Significantly, the interim government includes two traditional Tuareg leaders, who represent the insurrectionalist Azaouad Popular Movement and the separatist Azaouad Islamic Arab Front. In Niger, a national conference convened at the end of July 1991 promptly proclaimed its sovereign authority. Chaired by Professor Andre Salifou, dean of the faculty of education at Niamey University, the conference was attended by delegates from the Federation of Labor Unions, the Teachers' Union, the government itself, 24 registered political parties, and 69 other associations. In November the conference installed the interim government pending democratic elections after a 15-month transition period. Meanwhile, President Ali Saibou has resigned as president of the former ruling party, the National Movement for a Developing Society, which has been shorn of its special status. The president's own powers as head of state have also been sharply curtailed. Democratic reforms in Niger and Mali could provide an attractive alternative to warfare for the Tuareg people. Despite the troubled history of African-Berber relations, there are also many ties that bind. Like the Kurds, a Muslim people divided among several states in western Asia, the Sahelian Tuaregs could realize freedom for themselves as a transnational people if democratic governments were established in those sovereign states that contain their principal homelands. Both Mali and Niger have said Libya is the principal supporter of Tuareg separatism, Although Tuareg sources try to minimize the extent of Libyan involvement, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's role as champion of the Tuaregs is unmistakable. If the insurrections continue, Libya may be expected to provide sanctuary for Tuareg noncombatants, just as Algeria has provided sanctuary for both the Western Sahara independence movement and embattled Tuareg combatants and refugees in the past. Neither Mali nor Niger is able to resolve its Tuareg problem unilaterally or in concert with the other at present. In September 1990 the government of these two countries along with Algeria and Libya established an "interministerial committee" on the Tuareg question. Subsequently, in January 1991, bilateral negotiations between the Muslim government and Tuareg rebels were held in Tamanrasset, Algeria. The government agreed to withdraw troops from Tuareg areas in northern Mali, to devolve federal-type powers to the largely Tuareg regions of Gao and Timbuktu, and to allocate a substantial portion of the national budget to develop those regions for the next six years. In return, the rebels agreed to a cease-fire. Assassinations, banditry, and summary executions have since marred the implementation of these accords. Since the Tuareg people inhabit several adjacent areas in Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso, the problems of displacement, rebellion, and resettlement are clearly regional in scope. Three regional international organizations may be able to cope with the various issues relating to the Tuaregs more readily than individual states. The three groups are the Agreement on Nonaggression and Defense (ANAD), which includes Mali and Niger as well as Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Togo; the 16-member ECOWAS; and the newly formed Arab Maghreb Union, consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Although ANAD was used effectively to settle the Burkina Faso-Mali conflict of 1985, its functions are strictly political and initiated by heads of state, none of whom represent Tuareg interests. In contrast, ECOWAS is primarily an economic organization and can address a major aspect of the Tuareg problem--nomadic pastoralism as an economic activity and a way of life. Free passage across national boundaries, a necessary part of any political settlement that might satisfy the Tuaregs, implies at least some kind of free-trade zone. The current activities of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia show that its political potential is far greater than had been previously believed. Moreover, ECOWAS can enlist Nigeria as a guarantor of any agreement reached. The Arab Maghreb Union, whose goals include the creation of a fiscal union and the economic integration of its member-states, offers a way to contain Qaddafi's ambitions by harmonizing Libyan policies with those of its neighbors. ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union could conceivably resolve the Tuareg problem. Storm over Mauritania Mauritania is a sparsely populated country of some 2 million people and has been impoverished by desertification and endemic ethnic conflicts. (For general background, see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western Saharans (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1980).) The Moors, a people of mixed Arab-Berber descent, constitute two-thirds of the population. They are divided into two main groups: the Beydanes and the Haratines. The Haratines were originally slaves to the Beydanes. Although slavery has been abolished formally on three occasions in Mauritanian history, most recently by legislative action in 1980, Africa Watch, a human rights group, alleges that in 1990 these were at least 100,000 slaves in the country. (Africa News, July 23, 1990, p. 16.) The remaining one-third of the population consists largely of small ethnic groups who live mainly in the south. Near the end of his 18 years in power, Mauritania's first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, struggled with the burning question of Spanish Western Sahara. In 1975, he agreed to divide the former colony with a potentially menacing neighbor, Morocco, in order to create a land buffer between that powerful kingdom and Mauritania's northern-based mineral industry. However, the Mauritanian armed forces were unable to protect the mining operations against attacks by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario), the guerilla group fighting for the territory's independence, nor were they able to secure territory claimed by the Polisario as its own. Rising military expenses coupled with economic decline as a result of recurrent droughts and a dispirited army resulted in a 1978 coup and the evential assumption of power by a Polisario, or "Algerian," faction of the army that then renounced pro-Mauritania's claim to Western Sahara. In 1984, after another military coup, Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya became president of Mauritania. Taya sought to maintain good relations with both Morocco and the Polisario-Algerian alliance. But the consensual basis of his regime was shattered in 1987 when the government alleged it had thwarted a coup attempt by officers from the southern Toucouleur and Soninke ethnic groups. Tensions increased to the point of rupture along the country's main cultural dividing line that ranges Moor majority against the non-Moorish minority. While the minority, like the majority is Muslim, it firmly rejects the policy of cultural and linguistic Arabization that Taya's regime has aggressively pursued. Taya's ruling Military Committee for National Salvation consists of two principal political factions: the dominant Nasserites, or Qaddafists, who tend to support the Polisario-Algerian alliance; and the minority Baathists, who adhere to the pan-Arabist Iraqi movement and were pro-Moroccan until relations between Iraq and Morocco deteriorated in 1990-1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis. However, the main thrust of Mauritanian Baathist strategy has been Arabization at the expense of the non-Moorish minority, which is made up of people who have grand imperial traditions of their own and resent the imposition of cultural hegemony by the Moorish state. Furthermore, the Moors adhere mainly to the Islamic Qadiriiyya brotherhood, while most of the southerners are adherents of the rival Tijaniyya brotherhood. In 1989, conflicts over grazing land (a result of relentless desertification) involving villagers in the Senegal River Valley ignited the tinder of ethnic tensions in the capitals of both Mauritania and Senegal. When angry mobs looted the shops of Mauritanian merchants in Dakar in Senegal, Senegalese and other non-Moors were killed in Nouakchott. In all, hundreds of people died and more than 1,000 injured in reciprocal spasms of urban violence. According to one report, "During the ensuing months an estimated 170,000 Mauritanians fled Senegal while Mauritania reportedly expelled 70,000 Senegalese and 40,000 other nationals (the expulsion of the latter group underlining the schism between Arab and Black Mauritania)." (Arthur S. Banks, ed, Political Handbook of the World: 1990 (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1990) p. 413.) Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed, and "a brief but bloody exchange of artillery fire" was reported in January 1990. Subsequently, attacks by an African guerrilla organization, the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania have provoked reprisals in Mauritania. (West Africa (London), December 17-23, 1990, p. 3065.) Meanwhile, Moors have occupied land and villages abandoned by non-Moors in the valley. Mauritania has also demanded $1 billion from Senegal as compensation for economic losses and has alleged Senegalese government complicity in a coup plot against the Taya government. In turn, Senegal has threatened to assert a land claim north of the Senegal River, and has also alleged that arms have been sent from Mauritania to separatist rebels in the Casamance region of Senegal. This latter complaint indicates that particular Arab-"African" alliances complicate the picture of an Arab-"African" racial conflict in the region. The most significant transcultural tandem is the firm alliance between Senegal and Morocco. Before the Persian Gulf war in early 1991, Morocco's monarch, King Hassan II, was disturbed by the growth of Iraqi influence in Mauritania, which funneled weapons from Iraq to Polisario guerrillas. (Africa Confidential (London), August 24, September 22, and October 12, 1990.) Pro-Iraqi Baathists in Mauritania are foremost in both the Arabization campaign and the organization of violence against non-Moors. It was not surprising that Senegal, like Morocco, contributed a contingent of troops to the United Nations (UN) coalition that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait during the war. Soon after the UN victory in the Gulf, Taya announced a political reform program, including constitutional changes and multiparty competition. However, opponents of the regime denounced this maneuver as a subterfuge designed to consolidate the ruling group's power, and they disputed official reports of overwhelming approval of the new constitution in a later referendum. The opposition demands included the installation of an interim government pending the convocation of a sovereign National conference--a process similar to the one carried out in Niger. Taya's subsequent election as president, in January, 1992, was sharply disputed by the legal opposition, which includes the leadership of Mauritania's sole labor union as well as dissident Haratines. However, non-Moorish voices of dissent have been silenced or driven into revolutionary channels by severe repression. Amnesty International has reported that as many as 339 political prisoners may have died, many of them under torture in military or police custody between November 1990 and March 1991. (Amnesty International (London), Amnesty International Index: AFR 38/07/91.) Meanwhile the army continues to enforce an undeclared policy of expelling non-Moors, who live in the valley, from their homes. Despite the turn toward reform, Taya's regime appears to contemplate prolonged managed conflict with Senegal rather than a genuine settlement of critical disputes. Expulsion of the non-Moors from southern Mauritania, often on the dubious ground that they are not citizens, is a demagogic technique that diverts attention from pressing economic problems. Indeed, the problems caused by ecological deterioration and political disruption have been compounded by the loss of revenues that had been remitted by the prosperous Mauritanian merchant community in Senegal, as well as the loss of foreign aid previously given by Arab opponents of Iraq. Historically, the Moors have disdained farming in favor of pastoralism. Hence a general exodus of southerners would wreck havoc in the agricultural sector. Northern elites have exploited the issue of cultural differences between Moors and non-Moors since it allows them to contain a potentially divisive tension between the black and white sections of the Moorish community. The policy of Arabization, in particular, is designed to bind the Heratines to the Beydanes, who are aware of their exclusively Arab and Berber heritages. Left to themselves, the so-called white Moors would be vulnerable to Arab versus Berber conflicts and conflicts between clans. For all these reasons, the Nouakchott regime would not want to create a purely Moorish nation. Instead, its policy is to marginalize non-Moors within a multicultural political system. The fearful implication of this practice is continued internal warfare with potentially external consequences. Chad: A State of War In Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, particular ethnic groups (Moors, Bambara, and Hausa respectively) are large enough to dominate the country's political life. In the vast expanse of Chad, with its total population of nearly 5 million, only one group, the Christian-influenced Sara of the southern part of the country, numbers more than 1 million people. Outside the relatively fertile south, there are two other centers of political gravity. First, in northern Chad, the Toubou, adherents of the Islamic Sanusiyya brotherhood, overshadow a more numerous group of nomadic Arab clans that have not exercised political influence. Second, in Eastern Chad, Islamic peoples such as the Hajeray and Zaghawa are culturally oriented toward western Sudan. Chad has been torn by war ever since Qaddafi's regime in Libya extended support to northern insurgents against the southern-based government of President Francois Tambalbaye in 1971. Tombalbaye's assassination in a 1975 coup ushered in a period of instability that lasted until 1982, when Hissene Habre, a northerner yet a sworn enemy of Qaddafi, seized control of the Chadian government and summoned French military assistance to counteract Libyan intervention. Habre's consolidation of power culminated in the expulsion of Libyan forces from northern Chad in 1987. (For succinct, incisive accounts of Chadian politics and international relations, see Rene Lemarchand, "The Crisis in Chad," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds. African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 239-256; and William J. Foltz, "Chad's Third Republic: Strengths, Problems, and Prospects," CSIS Africa Notes, no. 77 (October 4, 1990, pp. 24-35).) Habre's regime was based mainly on collaboration between three highly politicized ethnic groups: Habre's own Gorane faction of the northern Toubou plus two eastern groups, the Hajeray and the Zaghawa. A Hajeray defection in 1984 reduced the number of groups to two. In 1989, the Zaghawas, sensing an erosion of their power, withdrew their support from Habre and organized an insurgent armed force, with Libyan backing, in western Sudan. Habre tried to negotiate a settlement with Qaddafi at a "summit" attended by the leaders of Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria in the Malian capital of Bamako in July 1989. Shortly thereafter, Chad and Libya agreed to submit a territorial dispute over the mineral-rich Aozou Strip in northern Chad to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. Habre continued to authorize the military training of Libyan dissidents in Chad, financed by Saudi Arabia and conducted by teams of American and Israeli instructors, while Libya continued to supply anti-Habre force in Sudan. In November 1990 the insurgent army, led by Colonel Idriss Deby, a well-regarded military commander, crossed into Chad, defeated the Chadian national army (forcing Habre into exile), and seized control of the government. Habre's fall was, at first, widely perceived to be a setback for the United States, which supported his seizure of power in 1982 as a stroke against Libya. However, after France, Habre's principal source of financial and military aid at the time of his fall was Iraq. Libya and Iraq are rivals in Chad, where Deby's assumption of the presidency marked a setback for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. (In Sudan the two countries continue to compete for favor with the military government of Brigadier General Omar Hassal Ahmed al-Bashir.) Initially, Deby's regime, based mainly on eastern elements--specifically his own Zaghawa ethnic group and the neighboring Hajeray--was unstable and liable to come apart. (Hugo Sada, "Les grandes manoeuvres d'Idriss Deby," Jeune Afrique (Paris), November 28-December 4, 1990, pp. 24-25.) In the past, Chadian regimes based on coalitions of rival claimants to power have been notoriously unstable; Deby's own coalition has already been strained by Hajeray-Zaghawa conflicts as well as struggles among Zaghawas themselves. Then, in January 1992, supporters of former President Habre crossed the border from Nigeria into western Chad; more than 100 people were killed before they were driven back. Despite recurrent rebellions and incursions, the fragmented polity of Chad may yet facilitate democratic reform, since this would prevent the monopolization of power by any one political bloc. Although Deby is himself a product of Chadian warlordism, he appears to have renounced that legacy by calling for a 30-month transition to a democratic government. A commission, representing diverse political views as well as the organized labor movement, has been asked to frame a legal code for the regulation of political parties. Deby has also pledged to convene a national conference, with sovereign authority, to draft a constitution no later than May 1992. Meanwhile, he is attempting to consolidate numerous military factions into a single national army. His two-track policy of democratization with discipline has generated new hope for the future of this deeply divided country. Reinforcing the Effects of Freedom In each of the four conflicts examined, an internal war, either ongoing or recently suspended, threatens to precipitate international warfare. The currently stilled border war between Mauritania and Senegal could restart at any time. In Senegal, Mali, and Niger the government views outbursts of civil strife in Mauritania with grave concern. The Berber Tuaregs of Mali and Niger are ethnic cousins of the Arab/Berber Moors and could be incited to violence by the racial and cultural conflict in Mauritania. Mali, in particular, is endangered by the potential transborder effects of that conflict. It would be logical to consider Mauritania's security problems in conjunction with those of Mali and Niger in multinational initiatives for peaceful solutions. Similarly, the interminable wars in Chad are unlikely to be concluded until the regional sovereigns, including all six states with which Chad shares a border, agree to a collective security arrangement. Without exception, the principal rivals for power in Chad have been utterly dependent on foreign patrons. Chad differs from the other Sahelian countries in its extreme degree of political fragmentation and the amorphous character of the Chadian state. An escape from the ravages of warlordism in Chad may come through the development of representative elections. Democratization may also help resolve the recurrent internal wars of Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, which are far more cohesive nation-states that Chad. In every case, the advance of democracy would facilitate the resolution of disputes and the maintenance of peace in a society where insecurity has been rife. It should not be assumed that African countries will deviate from the rule of thumb that modern democracies rarely if ever wage wars against one another. That proposition can be tested by looking at the transborder relationships of democratizing countries in the Sahel, such as the formerly troubled borderlands of Mali, and either Algeria or Burkina Faso. It could also be tested by examining the relationship between Mauritania and either Mali or Senegal, provided the process of proclaimed democratization in Mauritania becomes more genuine that it has thus far appeared to be. The democratization process in Mauritania could be driven off course by the winds of war in neighboring Western Sahara. Both Morocco and its antagonist, the Polisario Front, expect to be held under UN auspices in January 1992, but postponed pending the resolution of procedural questions and a dispute over who should be eligible to vote. (Morocco contends that its own citizens who are "born of the father" should be registered.) The choice before voters will be either independence for a Sahrawi republic or integration into Morocco. If a free and fair vote can be held, and if a credible result is obtained and accepted by the losing side, then Mauritania's own evolution toward democracy would be strongly promoted. Conversely, a state of war in sparsely settles Western Sahara would strengthen the hand of Mauritanian militarists who sympathize with their Hassaniyyan-speaking compatriots of the Polisario. Similarly, reconciliation through democracy in Chad of Niger could be undermined by threats to their security by Libya and Sudan, whose regimes are not accountable to the inhabitants of the two countries. These observations indicate that it would be difficult to test the hypothesis of a casual relationship between democracy and peace in the Sahelian region. Governments that have chosen the path of democratic reform are vulnerable by intervention from neighboring dictatorial states. Moreover, the probability that a few dictatorships will continue in this part of Africa implies that diplomatic initiatives and other precautions are required to minimize threats. At present, peacekeeping services, including conciliation and mediation, are provided in the Sahel by several intergovernmental organizations. They include the OAU, the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb Union, ANAD, ECOWAS, and special purpose groups, such as the "interministerial committee" on Tuareg issues. There is no apparent need for new intergovernmental organizations to secure peace among the Sahelian nations. However, the potential contribution of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the cause of peace in this region has not yet been explored. While the African Leadership Forum, itself an illustrious NGO, has recognized the important role of NGOs in relation to development problems, it has overlooked the potential utility of such bodies in resolving international conflicts. ("Report of a Brainstorming Meeting," op. cit.) Yet NGOs have attempted to mediate armed conflicts in Africa in the past. Most have been identified with religious groups and the results of their efforts, which have been recently summarized by David R. Smock, are mixed. (David R. Smock, "Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Mediation of Africa's Wars" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, August 30, 1991), p. 19.) The World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches jointly served as principal mediator on the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement on Sudan. Leading Mozambican clerics along with the Santo Egidio Community in Italy are playing central mediation roles in the negotiations between the Mozambican government and the Mozambican National Resistance (also known as Renamo). Smock also draws attention to the unsuccessful, yet constructive, attempts by former United States President Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center at Emory University during 1989 to mediate both the Ethiopian and the Sudanese conflicts. A few institutions comparable to the Carter Center, designed to study political and social problems, such as the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, already exist in Africa. Many more similar institutions are needed to critically examine the issues of war and peace. Their functions could encompass crisis prevention as well as mediation. Independent study centers could issue early warnings of potentially dangerous conflicts by means of objective analyses and scholarly communications. Respected NGOs could convene meetings, attended by diplomats, political actors, publicists, scholars, and others who could make positive contributions, to consider questions such as conflict resolution for disputes that have resulted in violence; existing or impending threats to the maintenance of peace between nation-states; and chronic causes of war, which require complex analyses and prescient remedies. The arrival of Africa's own peace movement may soon be at hand. Its emergence in war-torn countries and regions would be the logical consequence of increasing political freedom and allowing greater democracy. [Richard L. Sklar is a former president of the African Studies Association. His latest book, coauthored with C.S. Whitaker, is African Politics and Problems in Development (Boulder, Col: Lynne Rienner, 1991). Mark Strege has previously served with the Peace Corps as an agricultural extension agent in Mali.] </body> </article> </text>